Distributed Machine Learning (DML) is one of the core technologies for Artificial Intelligence (AI). However, in the existing distributed machine learning framework, the data integrity is not taken into account. If network attackers forge the data, modify the data, or destroy the data, the training model in the distributed machine learning system will be greatly affected, and the training results are led to be wrong. Therefore, it is crucial to guarantee the data integrity in the DML. In this paper, we propose a distributed machine learning oriented data integrity verification scheme (DML-DIV) to ensure the integrity of training data. Firstly, we adopt the idea of Provable Data Possession (PDP) sampling auditing algorithm to achieve data integrity verification so that our DML-DIV scheme can resist forgery attacks and tampering attacks. Secondly, we generate a random number, namely blinding factor, and apply the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) to construct proof and ensure privacy protection in the TPA verification process. Thirdly, we employ identity-based cryptography and two-step key generation technology to generate data owner's public/private key pair so that our DML-DIV scheme can solve the key escrow problem and reduce the cost of managing the certificates. Finally, formal theoretical analysis and experimental results show the security and efficiency of our DML-DIV scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a hot research spot in academia and IT industry in recent years. AI can help to solve various problems in people's real life, such as shopping recommendation, navigation, face recognition, and automatic driving. Hence, the research on artificial intelligence has important theoretical value and practical significance.
Machine Learning (ML), as the core technology of AI, is the fundamental way to make computers and networks intelligent. The application of machine learning spans all fields of artificial intelligence. For example, face recognition, navigation, and automatic driving can be realized through machine learning technology.
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Due to the poor efficiency of traditional machine learning technology, this technology cannot deal with large data, especially when the training data reaches the Peta Byte (PB) level or even larger. In order to solve the problem, some well-known companies such as Google and Microsoft have set up large-data-based machine learning and artificial intelligence research institutions to do the further research on distributed machine learning technology. Meanwhile, the Chinese Computer Society also treats the distributed machine learning technology as an important research area and the trend of big data.
A. RELATED WORK 1) DISTRIBUTED MACHINE LEARNING the graph model-based abstraction system, and the parameter server system. MapReduce-based systems, which include Hdoop [1] and Spark [2] , are widely implemented with their practical algorithms. However, the two systems run slowly than other specially designed distributed machine learning algorithms. Graph model-based abstraction systems, which include Graphla [3] and Pregel [4] , apply better parallel machine learning algorithms and flexible computation scheduling. However, in the systems, it is difficult to abstract the representation of the graph and rewrite the pattern of the graph. Also, the graph model-based abstraction system is more complicated than other systems. Compared with the previous two types of systems, the parameter server system architecture [5] - [9] can be efficiently and flexibly adopted to the parallel strategy of multiple machine learning algorithms. Moreover, with the open source, more and more people and companies use the structure of parameter server system. As shown in Fig.1 , the parameter server system consists of three entities, which are the Data server (DS), Worker nodes (WNs), Parameter server (PS).
In the parameter server system, multiple worker nodes perform calculations at the same time to ensure the high parallel efficiency for the system. Moreover, the training data are stored in the data server so as to reduce worker nodes' overhead of local storage. Hence, the parameter server system has become the mainstream framework for distributed machine learning.
However, in the parameter server system, it is not taken into account for the integrity of training data in DS. If network attackers forge the training data, modify the training data, or destroy the training data, the training model in the parameter server system will be greatly affected, and the training results are led to wrong. Therefore, it is extremely important to protect the integrity of training data.
2) DATA INTEGRITY PROTECTION SCHEME IN CLOUD COMPUTING
In cloud environment, the Provable Data Possession (PDP) integrity verification scheme is most effective. The PDP scheme adopts the sampling auditing, so it does not need to download all the data when performing data integrity verification. Thus, communication overhead is greatly reduced. In 2007, Atenies et al. [10] proposed first public sampling auditing scheme, named Provable Data Possession (PDP), with Homomorphic tag based on RSA. However, the first PDP scheme did not support dynamic auditing and data privacy protection. In 2008, Atenies et al. [11] further proposed their dynamic auditing scheme. However, their scheme was only partially dynamic, and did not provide data privacy protection. In 2009, full dynamic PDP scheme was proposed by Erway et al. [12] .
However, in the PDP scheme, there is a data privacy protection problem, which means the privacy of data will be disclosed in the TPA verification process. In order to achieve privacy protection, researchers proposed many privacy-preserving public auditing schemes based on PDP. In 2010, first privacy preserving PDP scheme was proposed by Wang et al. [13] . In their scheme, the authors applied integrating Homomorphic authenticator with the random masking technique to ensure the data privacy protection. In 2012, Zhu et al. [14] proposed a privacy-preserving public auditing scheme to support dynamic data operation. In 2013, Wang et al. [15] proposed a privacy-preserving public auditing scheme with a random masking technique to blind the response data. In 2017, Yu et al. [22] applied the concept of perfect data privacy-preserving for remote cloud storage auditing and proposed a new construction of ID-based protocol with key-homomorphic cryptographic primitive. Yan et al. [16] proposed a Remote Data Possession Checking (RDPC), which could withstand forgery attack, replace attack, and replay attack. However, the RDPC scheme did not support privacy protection. In 2018, Sookhak et al. [17] proposed a different authentication data structure with D&CT. In their D&CT structure, the authors introduced the logical subscript (LI) and version number (VN) of the data block to proficiently support dynamic data for normal file sizes. The authors also applied large-scale data storage to greatly reduce the computation and communication overhead for auditors and cloud servers. However, the authors did not consider the data privacy in the auditing process. In 2019, Zhao et al. [18] proposed a user stateless privacy-preserving public auditing scheme with the rank-based authenticated skip list. Yan et al. [19] proposed a public auditing scheme with the designated verifier. The data owner could designate one trusted person to check data. However, the scheme did not support privacy protection.
Also, most PDP schemes rely on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which may cause the key escrow problem and the certificate management overhead. In PKI, the Key Generate Center (KGC) is required to manage and store all users' public/private key pairs, hence the KGC may control all public/private key pairs, which may cause the key escrow problem. To solve the key escrow problem and reduce the cost of managing the certificates, in 2015, Wang [20] proposed an identity-based distributed provable data possession scheme in multi-cloud storage to implement data integrity verification. In 2016, Wang et al. [21] proposed a proxy-oriented data uploading and remote data integrity checking model with identity-based public key cryptography. In 2016, Zhang et al. [22] proposed an ID-based public auditing scheme in multi-user scenario. However, Zhang's scheme did not resolve key escrow problem, and could not support privacy protection. In 2017, Yu et al. [23] proposed a remote date integrity auditing scheme with perfect data privacy preserving with identity-based cryptosystems. However, Yu's scheme relied on PKI. In 2018, Li et al [24] proposed a certificateless public integrity checking scheme. The scheme released certificate management, and resolved key escrow problem by adopting certificateless signature and two-part private key. However, in the process of user revocation, computation cost was relatively huge. In 2019, Shen et al. [25] proposed their scheme to solve the problem of sensitive information sharing in the process of data integrity auditing. The proposed auditing scheme could realize the secure sharing of sensitive information. However, the scheme relied on PKI. Li et al. [26] proposed an efficient identitybased provable multi-copy data possession scheme to release heavy communication and computational cost caused by PKI. Zhu et al. [27] proposed a secure and efficient data integrity verification scheme for Cloud-IoT to reduce the computational overhead. However, the scheme did not resolve the key escrow problem.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In order to protect the integrity of training data in distributed machine learning system, in this paper, we propose the distributed machine learning oriented data integrity verification scheme (DML-DIV). To the best of our knowledge, our DML-DIV scheme is the first scheme in distributed machine learning area to apply public sampling auditing algorithm and ensure the integrity of training data. The main contributions of our DML-DIV scheme are as follows.
(1) In our DML-DIV scheme, we propose a data integrity verification scheme based on distributed machine learning. Our DML-DIV scheme can ensure the integrity of training data, resist forgery attack and tampering attack. In DML-DIV scheme, we first employ data owner's private key to construct data signature, then apply sampling technique and PDP technology to generate proof, finally apply bilinear mapping algorithm to verify the proof.
(2) Our DML-DIV scheme can guarantee the privacy of training data during the public sampling auditing process. Firstly, the data server adds a blinding factor to proof. Then the data server encrypts blinding factor, and sends the proof and blinding factor to the TPA. Finally, based on the discrete logarithm problem, the TPA and Network Attackers cannot decrypt the blinding factor to disclose the secret of training data.
(3) Our DML-DIV scheme can solve the key escrow problem and reduce the cost of managing the certificates. In DML-DIV scheme, we adopt identity-based cryptography algorithm to construct data owner's public/private key pair, so that all entities can verify the data owner's public key without certificates. Firstly, the KGC generates partial long-term private key for the data owner. Then, the data owner generates his private key with partial long-term private key. Finally, the KGC cannot figure out the data owner's private key with partial long-term private key.
(4) We formally prove DML-DIV scheme is correct, can resist forgery and tampering attack, ensure the privacy protection in the TPA verification process, and solve the key escrow problem. In addition, we evaluate the performances of our DML-DIV scheme and show the efficiency of our DML-DIV scheme.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce some basic knowledge and assumptions for this paper. Our DML-DIV scheme is proposed in section 3. In section 4, we give formal proof on our scheme to ensure the security goals. In section 5, we make performance analysis on our scheme. Finally, we make a conclusion in section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the basic mathematic algorithms and problems applied in the following paper.
A. BILINEAR MAPPING [28] Definition 1: Let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of a large prime order p, a pairing is a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 . It satisfies the following properties:
Computability:∀u, v ∈ G 1 , there is a polynomial time algorithm to calculate e (u, v) .
Safety: It is difficult to calculate the discrete logarithm problem in G 1 and G 2 .
B. DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM(DLP) [28] Definition 2: Let α ∈ Z * p , and G 1 be a multiplicative cyclic group, known g, g α ∈ G 1 , for any polynomial time adversary, the advantage of solving the value α is negligible. The probability of Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) algorithm A successfully solving the DLP is Adv DL = Pr[A(g, g α ) = α : α ∈ Z * p ], which is negligible. The probability comes from the random selection of α on Z * p and the random selection of algorithm A.
C. COMPUTATIONAL DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROBLEM(CDHP) [29] Definition 3: Let a, b ∈ Z * p , and G 1 be a multiplicative cyclic group, given P, P a , P b ∈ G 1 , for any polynomial time adversary, it is feasible in calculation to solve P ab ∈ G 1 . The probability of Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) algorithm A successfully solving the CDH problem is Adv CDHP = Pr[A(P, P a , P b ) = P ab : a, b ∈ Z * p ], which is negligible. The probability comes from the random selection of a, b on Z * p and the random selection of algorithm A.
D. CO-COMPUTATIONAL BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROBLEM(CO-CDH) [30] Definition 4: Let a ∈ Z * p , and G 1 ,G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups, given P, P a ∈ G 1 , Q ∈ G 2 , for any polynomial time adversary, it is feasible in calculation to solve Q a ∈ G 2 . The probability of Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) algorithm A successfully solving the Co-CDH problem is [30] Definition 5: Existential unforgeability of data owner's private key under security game is defined as follows:
Setup: The challenger runs Join algorithm and sends public key to the adversary A, and keeps secret key.
Queries: The adversary A can ask two queries to the challenger.
a) Hash Queries: The adversary A requests hash value based on an identity at most p H times of his choice ID 1 , · · · , ID p H ∈ {0, 1} * . The challenger computes Q ID , and sends hash value to A. b) Private key queries: The adversary A requests private key based on an identity at most times of his choice ID 1 , · · · , ID p s ∈ {0, 1} * . The challenger computes S ID , and sends private key to A.
Output: The adversary A outputs a pair (S ID , Pk, ID), where ID is not any of ID 1 , · · · , ID p H . The adversary A wins the game if Verify (S ID , Pk, ID) = valiad holds.
We define Adv A to be the probability that A wins in the above game.
Definition 6: The privacy protection of training data under security game is defined as follows:
Setup: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to generate public parameter u ∈ G 1 , where G 1 is a multiplicative cyclic group. We assume e (H 1 (X ) , syPQ) is the data server's private key, and R = u r is the corresponding public key.
Queries: The adversary A queries the public key of the random number c ∈ Z p .
Output: The adversary A can obtain the data server's private key r .
We let Adv = Pr r = r − 1/2. We say the TPA and Network attacker cannot obtain the data if the function Adv is negligible for any polynomial-time adversary A. 
III. OUR DML-DIV SCHEME

KGC:
The KGC is an authority that manages the data owner' s partial secret key. First, the KGC generates master secret key and public key. After receiving ID from the data owner, the KGC generates corresponding partial secret key for the data owner with the data owner's ID and master key.
DO: The data owner is responsible for collecting training data and uploading them to the data server. The training data may come from computers or mobile terminals.
DS: The data server is a cloud service provider that stores the training data from data owner. The data server accepts the challenge initiated by the TPA, generates proof, and sends proof to the TPA. The data server runs the protocol faithfully and proves that training data is stored correctly and completely.
TPA: Third party auditor (TPA) can verify the integrity of the training data stored in the data server. The TPA initiates a challenge to the data server, and receives a response from the data server. The TPA can carry out public auditing with the data owner's public key.
B. AN APPLICATION EXAMPLE
Based on the system model, our DML-DIV scheme can be applied in distributed machine learning algorithms for prediction, recommendation and classification. One of the examples is advertising recommendation application, which is illustrated in Fig.3 .
In advertising recommendation application, the users are data owners who register a web application, data server is the Amazon service provider who stores the user's data, the KGC is an application developer who generates the user's key, and the TPA is a trusted third party who verifies the integrity of data stored in Amazon. Firstly, the application developer runs Setup algorithm to generate and distribute private/public keys, and determine initial parameters. Secondly, the users generate signatures of advertisement clicking data, and upload data and signatures to Amazon service provider. Thirdly, the TPA sends challenge to Amazon service provider, and Amazon service provider sends proof to the TPA to verify the integrity of data. Fourthly, the TPA sends the results to users and worker nodes. Once the data is lost or damaged, worker nodes stop working. Then, worker nodes load data from Amazon, run Distributed Delayed Block Proximal Gradient Algorithm to obtain parameters, and push parameters to parameter server. Hence, the parameter server updates the original parameters with parameters from worker nodes. Finally, the application recommends favorite advertisement to the users based on the training results.
The distributed machine learning algorithm [8] that we use to train model is as follow:
C. THREAT MODEL
In our DML-DIV scheme, we define the threat model in terms of the Key Generate Center (KGC), Data Owner (DO), Data Server (DS), Third Party Auditor (TPA), Network Attackers (NA).
KGC: The KGC is semi-honest, which means it will generate the data owner's partial key, but it may figure out data owner's partial key.
DO: The data owner honestly collects training data and uploads training data to the data server.
DS: The data server is semi-honest. That is, it performs operations in accordance with the agreement with the data owner. But in order to maintain the reputation, it may conceal to data owner when the training data is lost or corrupted. At that time, the data server may attempt to forge proof to pass the auditing of the TPA.
TPA: The TPA is credible, and faithfully enforces the agreement. However, the TPA is curious about training data and tries to obtain the training data in the verification process. aggregate
) and x 2 H = x T Hx 5: end function NA: Network Attackers attempt to obtain the private key of the data owner, and disclose the secret of training data by intercepting the proof. In addition, Network Attackers attempt to tamper with and forge data proof and signature proof, and they may launch the tempering attack and forgery attack.
D. NOTATION
The symbols in our DML-DIV scheme are shown in the Table 1 . 
E. DETAILS OF OUR DML-DIV SCHEME
In this section, we propose the detail construction of our DML-DIV scheme. The scheme includes six steps: Setup, Key extra, Tag generation, Challenge, Proof generation, and Proof verification.
1) SETUP
Let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups with the same prime order p, e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is an efficiently computable bilinear map, and u is an element randomly selected from G 1 . Two one-way hash functions are
In RSA algorithm, d is the data owner's private key, c is the data owner's public key, and n is the modulus.
The KGC chooses an arbitrary generator P ∈ G 1 , randomly selects a master key s ∈ Z * p , and computes P pub = P s ∈ G 1 treated as a master public key. The system parameters are
The data owner sends its identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * to the KGC to generate partial private key. Firstly, the KGC computes Q = H 2 (ID), and applies the master key s to compute the data owner's partial private key D = Q s . The KGC sends the partial private key D to the data owner.
Secondly, the data owner can verify the correctness of partial private key from the KGC, as follows:
If the above equation (1) is correct, it indicates the partial private key received by the data owner from the KGC is correct. Otherwise, the data owner discards it and terminates the operation. Thirdly, if the partial private key is correct, the data owner randomly selects a secrete value x ∈ Z * p . Then, the data owner computes sk = H 1 (D x ) as its private key.
Finally, the data owner computes Z = P x pub = P sx , X = P sk and Y = ((H 2 (X ||Z )) · Q) x . The data owner sets pk = X , Y , Z as its public key.
All entities can use public parameters params and the data owner's identity ID to verify the public key of the data owner, as follows:
If the equation (2) holds, it is true that pk = X , Y , Z is the correct public key for the data owner.
3) TAG GENERATION
Firstly, the data owner collects training data, and generates corresponding signatures. The training data is F = {F 1 , F 2 , · · · , F m }, and the corresponding signature for data F i is σ i = (H 2 (W i ) · u F i ) sk , where W i = name||i (i = 1, 2, · · · , m), and the name is chosen by the data owner uniformly at random from Z p . Meanwhile, the data owner applies RSA signature algorithm to compute SIG sk ( name m) = (name||m) d mod n, where d is the data owner's private key in RSA signature algorithm, and n is the modulus in RSA signature algorithm. The data owner computes Sig F = name m SIG sk ( name m) as the signature of training data. Secondly, the data owner uploads training data and signatures {F, , Sig F } to the data server and deletes them in local storage, where = {σ i } i=1,2,···m .
Thirdly, after receiving training data from the data owner, the data server generates proof based on the uploaded data and signatures, and returns the proof to the data owner to prove training data is received and stored integrally. The proof is as follows: [1,m] [1,m] 
where v i , i = 1, 2, · · · , m is a random value in Z p . Simultaneously, the data server calculates R 1 = u r , and sends R 1 to the data owner, where r ∈ Z p is a random number (blinding factor). The data server will pass {σ, µ, [1,m] back to the data owner. And the data owner computes R = R sk 1 = u r·sk . Finally, the data owner verifies the proof returned by the data server, as follows: [1,m] 
When the above Equation (3) is established, it means that the data server receives and stores the training data completely.
4) CHALLENGE
Firstly, the TPA verifies the integrity of the training data signature Sig F by checking whether SIG sk ( name m) is a valid signature with the data owner's public key pk. That is, the TPA judges whether the equation SIG sk ( name m) c mod n ? = name||m is correct, where c is the data owner's public key in RSA signature algorithm, and n is the modulus in RSA signature algorithm. The TPA aborts the message if the verification fails. Otherwise, the TPA recovers name m, and further generates the following auditing challenge message.
Secondly, the TPA randomly selects challenge subscript set I of training data, where I ⊂ [1 , m] . The TPA also chooses a set of random numbers
Finally, the TPA generates the challenge Q = {I , v i,i∈I } and sends the challenge to the data server.
5) PROOF GENERATION
In response to the TPA's challenge, the data server generates the proof based on the challenge Q to ensure the correctness as follows:
where I ⊂ [1, m] and v i , i ∈ I come from the challenge Q, and r is a random value in Z p . Then the data server calculates R 1 = u r , and sends R 1 to the data owner, where r ∈ Z p is a random number (blinding factor). The data owner computes R = R sk 1 = u r·sk , and sends R to the data server. Finally, the data server sends the proof {σ, µ, R, H 2 (W i ) i∈I } to the TPA and ensures that it stores the training data integrally.
6) PROOF VERIFICATION
After receiving the proof generated by the data server, the TPA verifies the proof to judge whether the training data is intact as follows:
If the above Equation (4) is true, it means that the data server completely stores the training data. Otherwise, it indicates that training data stored in the data server is lost or damaged for some reason.
F. CORRECTNESS
Theorem 1: The data owner can correctly verify the correctness of partial private key generated by the KGC.
Proof: In order to prove that the data owner can verify the correctness of partial private key generated by the KGC, it is equivalent to prove the correctness of Equation (1). Based on the properties of bilinear map, the correctness of Equation (1) can be proved as follows: e (D, P) = e Q s , P = e(Q, P s ) = e(Q, P pub ) Theorem 2: Any entity can verify the data owner's public key with public parameters params and the data owner's identity ID.
Proof: To prove the correctness of the data owner's public key, it is equivalent to prove the correctness of verification Equation (2) . Based on the properties of bilinear map, the correctness of Equation (2) can be proved as follows:
where pk = X , Y , Z is the data owner's public key, and P pub is the master public key. Theorem 3: In our DML-DIV scheme, the TPA can correctly verify the integrity of training data stored in the data server.
Proof: In order to prove that the data server integrally stores the training data, it is equivalent to prove the correctness of Equation (4) . Based on the properties of bilinear map, the correctness of Equation (4) can be proved as follows:
Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Theorem 3 prove the correctness of our DML-DIV scheme. Theorem 1 proves the data owner can verify the correctness of partial private key generated by the KGC. Theorem 2 proves any entity can verify the correctness of the data owner's public key. Theorem 3 proves the TPA can correctly verify the integrity of training data stored in the data server.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS A. FORMAL PROOF
In this section, we formally prove that our DML-DIV scheme can resist forgery attack and tampering attack, solve the key escrow problem and prevent the TPA and Network Attackers from disclosing the secret of training data.
Theorem 4: In our DML-DIV scheme, it is computationally infeasible for the data server and Network Attackers to tamper with training data and signatures.
Proof: If any of the challenged training data blocks F i or corresponding σ i is corrupted or lost in the data server, the data server cannot pass the TPA's integrity verification.
When the data server wants to launch the tampering attack and tries to pass the TPA's integrity verification, the data server may use other pair of training data block and signature (F t , σ t ) to replace the chosen one (F i , σ i ). Then, the signature proof σ becomes:
The data proof µ becomes:
Then, the verification equation (4) can be expressed as:
Due to the collision resistance of hash function, (H 2 (W t )) v t (H 2 (W i )) v i cannot be equal to 1 in the oracle model. Thus, the integrity verification equation (4) does not hold, so that the data server cannot pass the integrity verification. Hence, our DML-DIV scheme can resist the tampering attack launched by the data server. In the same way, our DML-DIV scheme can also resist the tampering attack launched by Network Attackers. Theorem 5; In our DML-DIV scheme, it is computationally infeasible for the data server and Network Attackers to forge a proof to pass the TPA's auditing.
Proof: According to literature [31] , we can get the following proof form. If the data server could pass our verification by forging an auditing proof, this means that we can solve a Co-CDH problem (Definition 4), which contradicts the Co-CDH hypothesis.
Given the same challenge Q = {I , v i,i∈I } from the TPA, the correct proof should be P = {σ, µ}. However, the data server can forge an incorrect proof P = {σ , µ }, where σ = σ , µ = µ . If proof forged by the data server can pass TPA's verification, according to Equation (4), we can get:
As P = {σ, µ} is a correct proof, we can get:
Based on the properties of bilinear map, we can learn that:
The above formula can also be rewritten as:
where µ = µ − µ. Clearly, we can get:
At the same time, we can rewrite the above formula to get following equation:
That is, for given u, P, P sx , P sk , we can figure out u sk . Hence, we can find an algorithm to solve the Co-CDH problem (Definition 4), which contradicts the Co-CDH hypothesis. Therefore, it is computationally infeasible for the data sever to forge an auditing proof to pass the TPA's verification. In the same way, Network Attackers also cannot forge a proof to pass the TPA's data integrity verification in our DML-DIV scheme.
According to Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, we know that the data server can't pass the TPA's integrity verification if it doesn't store the training data completely. That is, our DML-DIV scheme can resist forgery attack and tampering attack by the data server and Network Attackers.
Theorem 6: In our DML-DIV scheme, we can solve the key escrow problem. That is, the KGC and Network Attackers cannot forge the user's private key. Suppose an (t, ε)algorithm can fake the identity ID. Then, we can find an t , ε adversary A that can solve the CDHP problem with t < t + P m (p H + p s + 1) and ε ≥ ε (p H +p s ) , where P m refers to the time required for a scalar point multiplication in G 1 .
Proof: Let P be a generator of G 1 , giving a CDHP triple (P, P a , P b ), where a, b ∈ Z * p , and noting (P, A, B) ∈ G 1 , the challenger C is to figure out P ab , which is solving the CDHP problem, and in contradiction with the Definition 3.
Let P pub = P a , the game between the challenger C and the adversary A can be described as follows: First, the challenger C sets up game, and input is 1 k . Then, the adversary A gets the system parameter params, and starts the game.
1) PUBLIC KEY QUERIES
The challenger C owns a table PT , which includes (ID i , c i , x i , y i , Q ID i ), and allows the adversary A to perform public key queries based on an identity ID i . Firstly, the challenger C checks whether the questioned ID i is in the table PT . If the ID i is not in the table PT , the challenger C randomly selects two elements x i , y i ∈ G 1 . Secondly, the challenger C flips a coin c i ∈ {0, 1}. We assume Pr(c i = 0) = δ, and Pr(c i = 1) = 1 − δ. If c i = 0, the challenger C computes P y i = H 1 (ID i ) = Q ID i , otherwise, the challenger C computes B y i = H 1 (ID i ) = Q ID i . Then, the challenger C responds to A with H 1 (ID i ) = Q ID i . Finally, the challenger C adds
If the ID i is in the table PT , the challenger C finds the Q ID i corresponding to the ID i in the table PT and sends Q ID i to A.
2) PRIVATE KEY QUERIES
The challenger C owns a table ST , which includes (x i , S ID i ), and allows the adversary A to perform private key queries based on an identity ID i . Firstly, the challenger C checks whether the questioned ID i is in the table ST . If the ID i is not in the table ST , the game returns to the public key queries phase. Otherwise, the challenger C finds the c i corresponding to the ID i in the table PT . If c i = 0, the challenger C computes A y i = S ID i and adds (x i , S ID i ) into the table ST . If c i = 1, the challenger C cannot generate the partial private key that can satisfy the verification equation.
3) OUTPUT QUERIES
The adversary A queries the ID that is not queried in the private key queries phase. The adversary A fakes the identity ID successfully and can get a record (ID, c, x, y, Q ID , S ID ). Since the adversary A successfully fakes the identity ID, e Y , P pub = e (H 2 (X ||Z ) · Q, Z ) is right. The challenger C views the c i corresponding to the ID. If c i = 1, then C fails. Otherwise, c i = 0 and thus e Y , P pub = e (H 2 (X ||Z ) · Q) yb , P a , e (H 2 (X ||Z ) · Q, Z ) = e(H 2 (X ||Z ) · Q, P sy ). Since e (H 2 (X ||Z ) · Q) yb , P a e (H 2 (X ||Z ) · Q) , P aby = e ((H 2 (X ||Z ) · Q) , P sy ), P sy = P aby is the solution to the CDHP problem owned by the challenger C.
Let the number of public key queries be p H ≤ p and the number of private key queries be p s ≤ p, The adversary A cannot repeatedly query the same ID, can only query up to p H + p s times. The challenger C gives the different query responses according to different values of the coin result c i . Let Pr(c i = 0) = δ, we know that the number of c i = 0 is (p H + p s )δ and the number of c i = 1 is (p H + p s )(1 − δ). In private key queries, if c i = 1, the challenger C cannot generate the partial private key that can satisfy the verification equation. Thus, the probability of failure is (1 − δ) and the probability of success is δ. Both the public key query and the private key query are successful, so that the challenger C can successfully solve the CDHP problem (refer to Definition 3). Thus, the probability of the challenger's success is ε > δ (1−δ)(p H +p s ) ε. If and only if δ = 1 2 , the maximum of
. Thus, the probability of the challenger's success is ε ≥ ε (p H +p s ) . It is assumed that after p H + p s queries, the adversary A can fake identity ID, that is, adversary A outputs a set of valid (ID, c, x, y, Q ID , S ID ) and e Y , P pub = e (H 2 (X ||Z ) · Q, Z ) is true. Therefore, the challenger C can solve the CDHP problem on group G 1 , which is in contradiction with the Definition 3.
Theorem 6 proves that our DML-DIV scheme solves the key escrow problem, that is the KGC and Network Attackers cannot forge the user's private key.
Theorem 7: In our DML-DIV scheme, according to the data server's response {σ, µ, R}, the TPA and Network Attackers cannot disclose the training data blocks. Suppose an (t, ε)algorithm can obtain the training data blocks in the auditing process. Then, we can find an t , ε adversary A that can solve the DLP problem with t ≈ 2t and ε ≥ ε 2 p . Proof: First, the adversary A initiates challenge to the data sever to obtain data proof µ.
Then, we assume that r ∈ Z p be the data server's private key and R 1 = u r be the corresponding public key. In the first step, the challenger C picks a random x ∈ Z p , computes R = u x and sends R to adversary A. Upon receiving R , the adversary picks a random element c ∈ Z p and sends c to C. Upon receiving c, the challenger C computes y = x + rc and sends y to A. If u y = R R c 1 , the adversary A accepts y, otherwise rejects it. Thus, the adversary A can obtain r. Furthermore, according to µ = i∈I v i F i + r, the adversary A can obtain:
If the adversary A performs the above operations |I | times, it can obtain a linear system of equations. Then, the adversary A will obtain training data blocks by solving the linear equations.
Through the above proof process, the adversary A can obtain the solution of DLP problem (Definition 2). Since the conditions for success is (t, ε), the adversary A can solve the DLP problem within t ≈ 2t and with non-negligible probability ε ≥ ε 2 p , which is in contradiction with the Definition 2.
Theorem 7 proves that our DML-DIV scheme can achieve privacy protection, that is, during the public auditing process, the TPA and Network Attackers cannot obtain the secret of training data.
B. SECURITY COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the security of our DML-DIV scheme with the schemes [15] , [19] , [27] , and [31] in Table 2 . The comparison is under the key escrow problem, the data server's forgery attack and tampering attack and privacy protection problem. According to Table 2 , our DML-DIV scheme can realize all of the security goals mentioned above, but other schemes cannot.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze computation cost and communication overhead in the process of integrity verification for training data, and evaluate the performance of our DML-IDV scheme in an example. We compare computation cost and communication overhead among Yan's scheme [19] , Zhu's scheme [27] , Wang's scheme [15] , He's scheme [31] and our DML-DIV scheme.
A. COMPUTATION COST
We evaluate the whole verification process on a desktop with Intel Core at 2.40GHz and 8G of RAM. The basic pairing algorithm is conducted through GUN Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) library version 6.1.2. We choose type d MNT curve from PBC library. We set that the length of G 1 is 175. All experimental results represent the mean of 20 trials.
In our experiment, L denotes the length of each data block, E G denotes a power operation on group G 1 and G 2 , E Z denotes a power operation on the number field Z p , M G indicates a multiplication operation on group G 1 and G 2 , M Z indicates a multiplication operation on the number field Z p , A Z indicates an addition operation on the number field Z p , and H denotes an operation of calculating the hash value for a number.
In the public sampling auditing scheme, the computation cost mainly happens on data server, TPA, and data owner, respectively.
1) COMPUTATION COSTS FOR DATA SERVER
In the whole verification process, the data server executes computation to generate proof. We simulate the proof generation time during data integrity verification on data server. We assume the number of blocks for file is 10000, that is m = 10000. The result is shown in Fig.4 .
In Fig.4 , the proof generation time is linearly increasing with number of challenged blocks. The reason is that data server only accumulates the challenged data blocks and multiplies corresponding signatures.
As shown in Fig.4 , the data server's computation cost in our scheme is smaller than that in schemes [15] , [19] , [27] , and [31] . In the scheme [19] , the data server needs to compute random subscripts and random numbers with challenge information from the TPA. In scheme [27] , the data server needs to compute more signature proof. In the scheme [15] , the system needs to compute a blind factor, with a bilinear mapping operation, an operation of hash value, and a power operation. In the scheme [31] , the system needs to split the data block twice and needs to aggregate data and signatures twice to obtain proof. In our scheme, the system only needs to compute a blind factor and aggregate training data and signatures to obtain proof. Therefore, in the process of generating proof, our scheme is more efficient than schemes [15] , [19] , [27] , and [31] .
2) COMPUTATION COSTS FOR TPA
In the whole verification process, the TPA executes computation to verify the proof. We simulate the proof verification time during data integrity verification on the TPA. We assume the number of data blocks for file is 10000, that is m = 10000. The result is shown in Fig.5 .
In Fig.5 , the verification time is linearly increasing with number of challenged blocks. The reason is that the calculation for Verification Equation (4) is only related to the number of challenged blocks.
As shown in Fig.5 , the TPA's computation cost in our scheme is smaller than that in schemes [15] , [19] , and [31] . And the TPA's computation cost in our scheme is larger than that in scheme [27] . In scheme [19] , the TPA needs to calculate the random subscripts and random numbers based on two functions. In the scheme [15] , the system needs to introduce the new exponential operations and multiplication operations to implement privacy protection. In the scheme [31] , the algorithm needs to aggregate proof from multiple servers into verification equation. In scheme [27] , there are only two pairing operations, one multiplication operation and one addition operation to verify the integrity of data. In our scheme, the TPA only needs to aggregate data block information H 2 (W i ) and calculate two bilinear mapping pairs. Therefore, in the process of integrity verification, our scheme is more efficient than the schemes [15] , [19] , and [31] , and is worse than the scheme [27] .
3) COMPUTATION COSTS FOR DATA OWNER
In the whole verification process, the data owner executes computation to generate signatures. In Table 3 , we analyze and compare the data owner's computation cost in computing the signatures among schemes [15] , [19] , [27] , [31] and our DML-IDV scheme. According to Table 3 , we can see that in terms of the computation cost for generating signatures, our DML-DIV scheme is equal to the schemes [15] , [19] , and [31] , and is slightly larger than the scheme [27] .
In our scheme, the computation cost of each signature is 2M G +E G +H , and the number of data blocks is size of (F)/L (where L represents the number of bits of a data block). Thus, for data file F, computation cost of generating signatures is size of (F) L (M G + 2E G + H ). As shown in Table 3 , the data owners' computation in our scheme is equal to that in schemes [15] , [19] , and [31] . The reason is the signatures of data blocks in schemes [15] , [19] , [31] are same as in our scheme. According to A Z +M Z < M G +E G , we can know that the data owners' computation in our scheme is slightly larger than that in scheme [27] . The reason is that in scheme [27] , data's signatures are in form of addition and multiplication.
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
In this section, we compare the communication overhead among Yan's scheme [19] , Zhu's scheme [27] , Wang's scheme [15] , He's scheme [31] and our DML-DIV scheme in Table 4 . In Table 4 , |Z p | represents the size of Z p , and |G| represents the size of group G 1 . In schemes [15] , [19] , [27] and our DML-DIV scheme, I represents the number of challenged data blocks. In the scheme [31] , I represents the number of challenged data servers and J represents the number of data blocks.
1) COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD FOR CHALLENGE
We compare the communication overhead for challenge among schemes [15] , [19] , [27] , [31] , and our DML-DIV scheme. In our DML-DIV scheme, the challenge is Q = {I , v i,i∈I }, which costs 2·I ·|Z p |. In scheme [19] , the challenge is Q = {c, k 1 , k 2 }, which costs 3 · |Z p |. In scheme [27] , the challenge is Q = {i, v i } i∈I , which costs 2 · I · |Z p |. In scheme [15] , the challenge is Q = {i, v i } i∈I , which costs 2 · I · |Z p |. In scheme [31] , the challenge is Q i = {j, v ij } j∈J (i ∈ I ), which costs 2 · I · J · |Z p |.
The communication overhead for challenge in scheme [19] is smaller than that in our DML-DIV scheme. The reason is that in the scheme [19] , the communication overhead for challenge is 3 · |Z p |, and in our DML-DIV scheme, the communication overhead for challenge is 2 · I · |Z p |(I > 2).
The communication overhead for challenge in scheme [27] is equal to that in our DML-DIV scheme. The reason is that the communication overhead for challenge in scheme [27] and our DML-DIV scheme is same as 2 · I · |Z p |.
The communication overhead for challenge in our scheme is smaller than that in the scheme [31] . The reason is that in the scheme [31] , the system needs to store same data blocks in multiple servers, which may cause the challenge to be sent to multiple servers. In our DML-DIV scheme, we separate the training data into n blocks and store data blocks in the data server, thus the challenge is only sent to one data server.
The PDP idea adopted by the scheme [15] is same as in our DML-DIV scheme, so the communication overhead for the challenge in scheme [15] is same as that in our DML-DIV scheme.
2) COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD FOR PROOF
We compare the communication overhead for proof among schemes [15] , [19] , [27] , [31] , and our scheme.
In our DML-DIV scheme, the proof sent by the data server is {σ, µ, R, H 2 (W i ) i∈I }, which costs (I + 1) |G| + 2|Z p |. In scheme [19] , the proof sent by cloud server is {T , F, H 2 (α||F id ||v i ) i∈I }, which costs (I + 1) |G| + |Z p |. In scheme [27] , the proof sent by cloud server is {R, µ, η, H (m ij ) i∈I }, which costs (I + 3) |G|. In scheme [15] , the proof sent by cloud server is {σ, µ, R, h(W i ) i∈I }, which costs (I + 1) |G| + 2|Z p |. In scheme [31] , the proof sent by cloud server is {σ i , µ i , h(W ij ) j∈J } i∈I , which costs J · I · |G| + 2I · |Z p |.
As shown in table 4, the communication overhead for proof in scheme [19] is slightly smaller than that in our DML-DIV scheme. The reason is that, in the scheme [19] , the communication overhead for proof is (I + 1) |G| + |Z p |, and in our DML-DIV scheme, the communication overhead for proof is (I + 1) |G| + 2|Z p |.
The communication overhead for proof in scheme [27] is approximately equal to that in our DML-DIV scheme. Since the order of group G 1 is equal to the order of Z p , we can get |Z p | ≈ |G|. Hence, (I + 3) |G| ≈ (I + 1) |G| + 2 Z p , which means the communication overhead for proof in scheme [27] is approximately equal to that in our DML-DIV scheme.
The communication overhead for proof in our scheme is smaller than that in scheme [31] . The reason is that, in the scheme [31] , multiple servers are required to generate proof and send the proof to the TPA to prove that they are storing the data together. In our DML-DIV scheme, we separate the training data into n blocks and store data blocks in the data server, thus, only one server needs to send proof to the TPA.
The PDP idea adopted by the scheme [15] is same as our DML-DIV scheme, so the communication overhead for the proof in scheme [15] is same as that in our DML-DIV scheme.
C. EVALUATION OF OUR DML-DIV SCHEME
In this section, we apply the application of advertising recommendation given in part B of section 3 to evaluate the efficiency of our DML-DIV scheme.
We collect an advertisement click prediction dataset with 1.7 billion examples and 0.65 billion unique features. This dataset is 1.41TB, which is stored in Amazon. We run the Parameter Server framework on 12 machines, each with 8 physical cores. Nine machines act as worker nodes, and three machines act as parameter servers.
We apply a distributed machine learning algorithm [8] to evaluate the efficiency of our DML-DIV scheme. The comparison for computing and waiting time between general Parameter Server without data integrity protection and our DML-DIV schemes is showed in Fig.6 .
According to Fig.6 , in general Parameter Server framework without data integrity protection, the computing time is 0.903 hours, and the waiting time is 0.112 hours. In our DML-DIV scheme, the computing time is 0.924 hours, and the waiting time is 0.126 hours. Hence, our DML-DIV scheme is almost same as general Parameter Server framework in waiting and computing time. Although in our DML-DIV scheme, the system needs to verify the integrity of training data, the added computing and waiting time for each work node is almost negligible. Therefore, in waiting and computing time, our DML-DIV scheme is almost same as general Parameter Server system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a distributed machine learning oriented data integrity verification scheme (DML-DIV) for the parameter server framework. Our DML-DIV scheme can ensure the integrity of the training data stored in the data server, and resist forgery attack and tampering attack. Additionally, our DML-DIV scheme provides privacy protection, solves the key escrow problem, and reduces the cost of managing the certificates. Finally, the simulation results show our DML-DIV scheme performs more efficiently than other schemes.
